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INTRODUCTION
Congress has aggressively banned activity involving child
pornography and has issued numerous directives to the United
States Sentencing Commission ("Commission") to increase
punishment. As a result, prosecutions and sentences have risen

I Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. My thanks to Bridget
Crawford, Linda Fentiman, and John Furfaro for their comments and support.
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dramatically.' With the demise of mandatory sentencing,2 a
growing number of district court judges have deviated downward
from the sentencing guidelines ("Guidelines"), particularly in
possession cases. The debate over the appropriate sentences for
convicted child pornographers has also intensified among
scholars, judges, legislators, and the general public. Either
through judicial rejection of guideline suggestions or through
direct action by the Commission, sentencing reform appears
likely.3 However, the concentrated focus on sentencing overlooks
a vital, broader inquiry into the offenses themselves and the
changes technology has wrought in how they are committed.
This Article seeks to fill this gap and provide a framework
for a normative evaluation of the offenses and their sentences. It
contends that laws enacted to address physical world issues of
child pornography dissemination are obsolete in the virtual
world. It was clear in the late 1970s, when investigative
reporters first exposed the child pornography market, which
actors fell into the categories of transporters, distributors, and
receivers.' For example, in the past, Suspect Sam would get
child pornography from a smut peddler and Suspect Sam's
possession of it would not even be a crime.- Today, Suspect Sam
most likely gets his child pornography from his home computer
1 TROY STABENOW, DECONSTRUCTING THE MYTH OF CAREFUL STUDY: A PRIMER
ON THE FLAWED PROGRESSION OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES 2-3
(2009), availableat http://www.fd.org/docs/Select-Topics---sentencing/child-porn-julyrevision.pdf. For example, for one defendant who distributed five images of a child
under the age of twelve, the 1987 Guideline range was 12 to 18 months; however, by
2004, the Guideline range was 188 to 235 months. Id. at 27-28. See infra Part I.D
for a discussion of the impact of this report.
2 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258-60 (2005).
' The Sentencing Commission recently completed a multiyear review of the
child pornography Guidelines that was prompted in large part by changing
technology, increased prosecutions, and sentiment that the sentencing scheme was
overly harsh. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: FEDERAL
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES i-iii (2012) [hereinafter 2012 COMMISSION
REPORT], available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressionaltestimony-and-reports/sex-offense-topics/201212-federal-child-pornography-offenses/
FullReport toCongress.pdf see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, THE HISTORY OF
THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES 54 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 COMMISSION
REPORT],
available at http://www.ussc.gov/ResearchandStatistics/Research
Projects/Sex Offenses/20091030OHistoryChildPornographyGuidelines.pdf.
* See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY:
FINAL REPORT 599-603 (1986) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
s See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110-11 (1990) (noting that only nineteen
states had banned possession of child pornography in 1990).
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and, by downloading images, he both receives and possesses the
images. Current law dictates that Suspect Sam gets a minimum
sentence of five years for receiving the images, and up to ten
years for possessing them-with no mandatory minimum for the
possession.' In addition, simply because he used a computer to
commit the offenses, Suspect Sam's sentence would be increased.
To further illustrate the impact of technology, if Suspect Sam
downloaded the images from a peer-to-peer application and
stored them in a shared online folder, in addition to the receiving
and possessing charges, he could also be charged with
distributing the images.' These redundancies are not merely
sentencing issues; more essentially, there is an overlap in
charges since the very same action gives rise to multiple offenses.
The once-clear divisions between distribution, transportation,
and receipt are blurred in cyberspace. Thus, examining the child
pornography statutes is a requisite to addressing current
sentencing controversies. Meaningful scrutiny must be grounded
in the rationale for the ban on child pornography-the harm to
the children depicted.
This Article traces the history of the child pornography laws
and sentencing policy in Part I. Part II explains the technologies
that have caused some of the current controversies, and then
Part III describes how these technologies have blurred the
offenses. Finally, Part IV makes suggestions as to how the law
could better reflect technology and comport with a refined harm
rationale. Courts, legal scholars, and medical experts have
explained the harm includes the sexual abuse captured in the
images and the psychological injury the victim endures knowing
the images are being viewed. This Article further develops the
harm rationale by explaining that the harm rests on a
fundamental injury to the victim's human dignity and privacy.
Drawing on comparisons to diverse laws such as the Geneva
Convention's ban on photographs of prisoners of war, this Article
states that all traders in child pornography violate the rights of
the children depicted, and therefore, inflict harm, albeit at
different levels. This Article suggests that a statutory scheme
that divides pornographers into three groups-producers,
traders, and seekers-would best reflect how technology has
6

18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2012).

See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
* See infra notes 153, 155 and accompanying text.
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changed the manner in which pornography is gathered and
spread. Sentences could be calibrated accordingly to punish for
the harm inflicted by the pornographers.
I.

BACKGROUND

CurrentLaw
Federal laws enacted to protect children from child
pornographers can be divided into two main categories: First,
Congress has enacted a stringent ban on producing child
pornography, with a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen
years.9 Second, Congress has banned all aspects relating to the
trafficking of child pornography, including transporting,
distributing, receiving, possessing, accessing, soliciting, or
advertising child pornography. 0
Congress has mandated
minimum five-year sentences for transporting, distributing, and
receiving, while the other offenses have no minimum sentence."
The following subsection provides a chronology of legislative and
judicial action on pornography offenses, with complementary
sentencing guidelines. The piecemeal and reactive development
of the law demonstrates why deep structural changes are
presently needed.
A.

Legislative and JudicialHistory
Following an increased public awareness of the scourge of
child pornography in the late 1970s, Congress passed the
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977.12
The Act punished commercial producers,1 3 transporters,

B.

9 18 U.S.C. § 2251.
10 Id. § 2252A.
n Id. § 2252A(b)(1)-(2). Attempts are punished the same as the completed
offenses. Id.
1 Pub.
L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (2012)). See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 40815; EVA J. KLAIN ET AL., AM. BAR AS'N CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE LAW, CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY: THE CRIMINAL-JUSTICE-SYSTEM RESPONSE 12 (2001).
" Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 § 2,
18 U.S.C. § 2251. The commercial purpose requisite stemmed from an erroneous
assumption by Congress that pecuniary gain was the driving force behind the
creation and trading of child pornography. See Annemarie J. Mazzone, Comment,
United States v. Knox: Protecting Children from Sexual Exploitation Through the
Federal Child PornographyLaws, 5 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &ENT. L.J. 167,
182-83 (1994). It became clear by the lack of successful prosecutions under the 1977
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distributors, and receivers of obscene child pornography."
During this same time period, states were also enacting their
own bans on child pornography without the obscenity
requirement." This led to the 1982 landmark ruling in New York
v. Ferber,6 in which the United States Supreme Court held that
child pornography was not protected by the First Amendment
even if it was not obscene because it was "intrinsically related to
the sexual abuse of children."" The Court reasoned that the
materials produced were a permanent record of the child's
participation and the harm to the child was exacerbated by their
circulation.18 The Court recognized the dignitary harm inflicted
by child pornographers, observing that they violate "the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters."
Following Ferber, Congress amended the original federal
child pornography legislation to remove the obscenity and
commercial purpose requirements.2
Congressional hearings
leading to the amendments found that much of the trade between
child pornographers was by gift or exchange, so the commercial
purpose requirement unnecessarily limited the reach of the law.2 '
Thus, from very early on, Congress was aware purveyors of child
pornography were motivated by more than money;22 this impulse
has been greatly exacerbated by technology.

Act that the commercial purpose limitation was thwarting enforcement efforts.
Moreover, future congressional investigation revealed that child pornography rings
were a cottage industry among like-minded individuals. Id.; see Audrey Rogers,
Protecting Children on the Internet: Mission Impossible?, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 323,
326-28 (2009).
14 18 U.S.C. § 2252. The obscenity requirement was based on congressional fear
that the courts would strike the legislation as unconstitutional without it. See Amy
Adler, Inverting the FirstAmendment, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 929-30 (2001).
15See Adler, supra note 14, at 930-32.
16 458 U.S. 747, 773-74 (1982).
"1 Id. at 759.
18

Id.

19Id. at 759 n.10 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977)).

20 Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. 0§ 2251-2253 (2012)).
21 Mazzone,
supra note 13, at 182. Congress also found the obscenity
requirement posed enormous hurdles for prosecutors given the complexity of
obscenity rules and standards. Id.
22 See, e.g., United States v. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 343, 369-70 (E.D.N.Y.
2011).
23 Id. at 373-74.
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The hearings also revealed that production of child
pornography was so clandestine that, between 1978 and 1984,
only one person was convicted for producing child pornography.2 4
Thus, the need to stop the flow, rather than the production of
child pornography, became the preferred route for prosecutors.
The difficulty of reaching producers has not abated as most child
pornography is now produced overseas in countries with few or
no effective laws against child exploitation.
Originally, there was no federal ban on possessing child
pornography in large part because the Supreme Court had
previously ruled possession of obscene materials was protected by
the First Amendment.26 However, in Osborne v. Ohio,2 7 the
Court ruled that the mere possession or viewing of child
pornography victimized children and the state could prohibit it.28
The Osborne Court reiterated that pornography is a permanent
record of a victim's abuse that "causes the child victims
continuing harm by haunting the children in years to come."29 In
addition, the Court reasoned that banning possession would
protect future victims of child pornography by drying up the
market for it.30 Congress reacted to Osborne and passed the

See FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 604.
See Int'l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, Child Pornography: Model
Legislation & Global Review, http://www.icmec.org/missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?
LanguageCountry=en_X1&Pageld=4346 (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
26 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969). The Stanley Court reasoned
that prohibiting the possession of obscene materials in one's home was inimical to
the very premise of the First Amendment's protection against state interference
with what a person thinks, reads, or views in the privacy of his home. Id. at 565-66.
It specifically rejected the state's claim that it had a legitimate interest in banning
the possession of obscene material because this material may lead to sexual violence.
Id. at 566-67. The Stanley Court stated that not only was there no empirical
evidence that supported the state's claim, but that crime prevention is better served
by "education and punishment for violations of the law" than by criminalizing
anticipatory conduct. Id. The Stanley Court also rejected the state's contention that
criminalizing possession was needed to support the state's ban on the distribution of
obscene materials, reasoning that this need did not justify a ban on what a person
read or viewed in his home. Id. at 567-68.
27 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
28 Id. at 109-10 (distinguishing its ruling in Stanley and holding that the
state's
interest in protecting children by banning possession of child pornography
outweighed a defendant's First Amendment rights because of the harm inflicted to
children by all involved in the child pornography chain).
29 Id. at 111.
so Id. at 109-10. The Osborne Court also added a new prospective rationale for
the possession ban: to thwart the use of images to seduce new victims. Id. at 111.
24
25
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Child Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of
1990, which banned possession of three or more images of child
pornography.
The advent of computer technology led to congressional
concerns that existing legislation was out of date. In 1996,
Congress expanded the definition of child pornography to
encompass images that "[are] or appearf to be, of a minor

engaging in sexually explicit conduct." 2 The Supreme Court
struck down the ban on virtual child pornography because
production of virtual child pornography did not abuse actual
children.33 Congress responded with the 2003 PROTECT Act
which, among other things, outlawed computer-generated
a1 S. Res. 3266, 101st Cong. (1990) (enacted as 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2012)).
Subsequent legislation banned possessing any images but created an affirmative
defense for possession of less than three images when the defendant took steps to
destroy the images or reported them to the authorities. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(d).
32 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2012) (emphasis added) (repealed 2003). Congress's
ban on pornographic images of such virtual children was based on congressional
findings of compelling state interests in protecting actual children from all child
pornography, whether depicting real or virtual children. "The legislative history of
the CPPA was premised on thirteen findings, including that pedophiles use images
of child pornography to seduce actual children to engage in sexual conduct by
reducing their inhibitions and desensitizing them." Rogers, supra note 13, at 328; see
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat.
3009-26, 3009-26-3009-27 (1996). Additionally, Congress found that both real and
virtual child pornography whetted the appetite of molesters by fueling their
fantasies and stimulating their desire to molest an actual child. § 121(1), 110 Stat.
at 3009-26-3009-27. Congress found further that the child pornography prosecutions
would be increasingly difficult as images of virtual children become
indistinguishable from actual victims of child pornography. See id. § 121(1)(5)-(9).
Second, it included as child pornography those materials that are "advertised,
promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the
impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D).
3
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002). The majority also
rejected the government's indirect harm arguments. It ruled that the risks of virtual
pornography whetting the appetite of child molesters or being shown by molesters to
seduce children were too remote to support an abridgement of constitutionally
protected speech. Id. at 253-54. In addition, the majority disagreed with the
government's position that prohibiting virtual pornography is necessary to dry up
the market for actual child pornography because they are part of the same market.
Id. at 254-55. It noted the reverse-that allowing virtual pornography could in fact
protect children by drying up the market of actual child pornography. The majority
also upheld challenges to the CPPA's pandering section that prohibited materials
that "convey[ed] the impression" that they were of a minor engaged in sexually
explicit conduct. Id. at 255-56. The Court noted that the provision prohibited
possession of a sexually explicit film containing no minors merely because it was
promoted as containing minors. Id. at 257.
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pornography that is "indistinguishable" from a real depiction,
and created a five-year minimum sentence for transporting,
distributing, or receiving child pornography.
Part of the
PROTECT Act included a new pandering provision with the
same statutory sentence rules as the possession offense. 8
Accordingly, even if images of child pornography are computergenerated, the speech offering or seeking them can be
proscribed.36 Further acknowledging the impact of technology, in
2008, Congress expanded the ban on possession to include
"access[ing] with intent to view" online images of child
pornography after defendants had successfully argued they did
not possess images unwittingly stored in their computers.
C.

Sentencing History
Parallel to congressional and judicial actions on child
pornography offenses were the development of the Guidelines.
Congress included mandatory minimums and maximums in
many of the child pornography laws" and directed the
Sentencing Commission to establish Guidelines to implement the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which created the mandatory
sentencing Guidelines.3" The Guidelines were meant to limit
14 See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools To End the Exploitation of
Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, §§ 103(b)(C),
103(b)(E), 502(a)(1), 117 Stat. 650, 653, 678. The constitutionality of the
"indistinguishable" language is untested.
5 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (punishing a person who knowingly "advertises,
promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits" child pornography). The Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the pandering provision and ruled that offers to
engage in illegal activity were excluded from First Amendment protection. See
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298-99 (2008).
36 See generally Rogers, supra note 13.
37 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). See generally Ty E. Howard, Don't Cache Out Your
Case: Prosecuting Child PornographyPossession Laws Based on Images Located in
Temporary Internet Files, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1227 (2004).
38 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b).
39 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1837,
1987-88 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) (2012)). See generally
2009 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3. To do so, the Guidelines are structured so
that each offense has a base offense level, which is then adjusted up or down by
applying special offense characteristics. For example, the current base level for
receiving child pornography is twenty-two; special offense characteristics include
adding two levels if the images involved a child under twelve years old, four levels if
the images portrayed sadistic behavior, and two levels for use of a computer;
decreases by two levels are made if the defendant did not intend to distribute the
material. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (2013); ORIN S. KERR,
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judicial discretion, provide for more uniformity in sentences, and
reflect the purposes of punishing those who commit federal
offenses.4 0
From the outset, the Commission labeled
transporting, receiving, or distributing offenses as "trafficking" in
child pornography."
In a foreshadowing of current sentencing controversies,
when possession was federally outlawed in 1991, the Commission
amended the Guidelines by moving the receipt offense to the new
possession guideline because it determined that "receipt is a
logical predicate to possession."42 This change lasted less than
one month because of strong congressional objection to the
reduced penalty for receiving child pornography. 48
The
Commission continued to recognize the overlap between
possession and receipt but separate Guidelines existed for
trafficking offenses and possession offenses until 2004, when the
Commission finally consolidated them.44 As discussed below, the
consolidation of sentencing criteria without changes in offense
categories only served to worsen sentencing controversies.6
COMPUTER CRIME LAw 278-79 (2d ed. 2009). The court can then make additional
upward or downward modifications based on the specific circumstances of the
defendant, the crime, or the victim. For example, if the defendant accepts
responsibility for his actions, the offense level is decreased by two levels. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2013). With that final offense level
calculation, the defendant's criminal history is considered and categorized. The
Guidelines then provide a sentencing table that assigns a sentencing range. For
example, in the previous example of a defendant receiving child pornography, if the
defendant's final offense level is twenty-six, and he has no prior offenses so that his
criminal history category is I, the Sentencing Table would call for a sentencing range
of sixty-three to seventy-eight months. KERR, supra.
40 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012); 2009 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
3, at 1 n.2. The four punishment rationales can be summarized as retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.
41 See 2009 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 14 (using trafficking to refer
to the § 2252 crimes of transporting, receiving, and distributing child pornography).
Initially, there were only two offense characteristic increase triggers: minor under
twelve years old and distribution based on retail value. Id. at 12, 17; see also infra
notes 160-82 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of the distribution
enhancement).
42 2009 COMMISION REPORT, supra note 3, at 19.
43 Id. at 19-22.
" Id. at 42-43. With the consolidation, the Commission added a two-level
decrease if defendant's conduct was limited to receipt without intent to distribute.
Id. at 48. It did so specifically to ameliorate the disproportionality in sentences that
the mandatory minimum was apt to create because it found that simple receipt was
very similar to simple possession cases. Id.
4 See infra Part III.
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Over the years, the Commission added numerous offense
enhancements based on what it assessed to be aggravating
factors, such as depicting prepubescent children4 6 or sadomasochistic attacks on children.4 7 While some enhancements
were made after the Commission conducted a detailed study of
empirical data, other enhancements resulted solely from
The most controversial today are
congressional directive.
discussed below.
D. CurrentSentencing Controversy
A chorus of scholars and judges have criticized the
Guidelines as being more the product of public hysteria over
child pornographers rather than being tied to a rational
assessment of the goals of punishment. 48 A leading critic of the
current sentencing regime, Troy Stabenow, noted in his widelycited report, "The flaw with U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 today is that a
common, first time offender can chart at the statutory maximum,
regardless of Acceptance of Responsibility and Criminal
History."4 9 He outlined how the Commission increased the
Guidelines based on congressional directives, such as the
PROTECT Act's mandate of five-year minimums for trafficking
offenses, rather than on empirical studies. 5
For example, at the same time Congress made its failed
attempt to ban computer-generated child pornography in 1996, it
also directed the Sentencing Commission to increase sentences

4 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(2) (2013) (adding twolevel enhancement).
" See id. § 2G2.2(b)(4) (adding four-level enhancement).
4
See, e.g., STABENOW, supra note 1, at 38; Jelani Jefferson Exum, Making the
Punishment Fit the (Computer) Crime: Rebooting Notions of Possession for the
Federal Sentencing of Child Pornography Offenses, 16 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8, 23-24
(2010); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child Pornography from Child Sex
Abuse, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 853, 865 (2011); Arlen Specter & Linda Dale Hoffa, A
Quiet but Growing Judicial Rebellion Against Harsh Sentences for Child
Pornography Offenses-Should the Laws Be Changed?, 35 CHAMPION 12, 13 (2011);
see Melissa Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child Pornography Sentencing:
Empirical Validity or Political Rhetoric?, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 545, 560-61
(2011).
4 STABENOW, supra note 1, at 26. A Westlaw search conducted on February 13,
2012 showed sixteen federal circuit court and twenty-three district court citations to
the report.
50 STABENOW, supra note 1, at 21.
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whenever a computer was used in child pornography offenses.'
It did so but cautioned such a broad application did not
adequately differentiate between computer users, who, in 1996,
could range from a simple downloader to a "large-scale,
commercial pornographer [ . . . who [could] upload, send or post

illegal images."52
The Commission's promise to monitor the array of computer
usage is all the more necessary today because computer
technology has fundamentally altered the child pornography
landscape. While only twenty-eight percent of defendants used a
computer to commit child pornography offenses in 1995, by 2008,
ninety-six percent of defendants used one, and today, that
number is most likely one hundred percent.53 This ubiquitous
use is at the heart of the criticism of the enhancement. 5 More
significantly, the abilities the Commission ascribed only to
sophisticated commercial operators, such as posting and
uploading, can be performed by anyone today on a personal
computer or tablet. Thus, the enhancement is flawed because
the very nature of computer capabilities make the trafficker and
purveyor distinction meaningless.
Another enhancement that has garnered extensive criticism
is for the number of images possessed.66 First added in 2003, this
enhancement did not have the benefit of empirical study or the
standard notice and public comment period. 6 Because computer
technology allows individual to gather hundreds of images with
the click of a mouse, some have criticized this enhancement as

51 2009 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 26, 30. The congressional
directive was contained in the Sex Crimes Against Children Prevention Act of 1995.
Id. at 26.
52 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SEX OFFENSES AGAINST CHILDREN: FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING FEDERAL PENALTIES 28-29 (1996), available at

http://www.usse.gov/Legislative andPublicAffairs/CongressionalTestimony and
Reports/SexOffenseTopics/199606_RtCSexCrimes.AgainstChildren/199606_Rt
CSCAC.pdf.
5 STABENOW, supra note 1, at 16; 2009 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at
30 n.148.
5 See, e.g., STABENOW, supra note 1, at 15-16. See generally Exum, supra note
48; Hessick, supra note 48.
66 Ian N. Friedman & Kristina W. Supler, Child Pornography Sentencing: The
Road Here and the Road Ahead, 21 FED. SENT'G REP. 83, 85 (2008).
56 STABENOW, supra note 1, at 23-24; 2009 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3,
at 39 n.190. The effective date of the enhancement was in November 2004. See 2012
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 140.
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inconsequential in assessing blameworthiness.
Professor
Douglas Berman has echoed Stabenow's findings and has
testified that sentencing enhancements such as use of a computer
"[are]
irrational because logically and factually, the
characteristics are simply not genuine aggravating factors.
Rather, they are inherent in just about any downloading
offense.""
Other scholars criticize the sentences as based upon a faulty
premise that possession of child pornography is as bad or worse
than the child abuse that created it.' 9 They assert this parity
fails to recognize the derivative nature of the child pornography
offenses in that images are unlawful only because they are
recording and then spreading images of actual abuse."o Critics
further claim that part of the increase is based on an unproven
preventative rationale that possessors of child pornography are
more likely to abuse children.6 ' As part of its review of child
pornography offenses, the Sentencing Commission examined a
number of studies and concluded that while general recidivism
rates for downstream users of pornography were similar to that
of all federal offenders, the rate of sexual recidivism was less
than commonly believed.6 2 Yet, it found also that as many as
thirty-eight percent of downstream users had prior criminal
sexually dangerous behavior."
In addition to scholarly criticism, surveys of district court
judges conducted by the Commission in 2009 show that seventy
percent believed the Guideline range for possession was too high;
sixty-nine percent thought the range for receipt was too high;
and thirty percent believed the range for distribution was too

57 See, e.g., United States v. Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1010 (E.D. Wis.
2008). See generally STABENOW, supra note 1, at 21; Friedman & Supler, supra note
55.
58 United States v. Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 397 (D.N.J. 2008), affd, 624
F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 2010).
69 Adler, supra note 14, at 985 ("Child pornography law conflates act and
image[s]."); Hessick, supra note 48, at 864-65. But see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 759-60 n.10 (1982).
60 See, e.g., Hessick, supra note 48, at 865, 867-68.
61 See Hessick, supra note 48, at 870-71.
62 2012 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 306-10. It found a 30% rate of
general recidivism, but only a 7.4% rate of sexual recidivism. Id. at 310.
* Id. at 205.
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high.' Circuit courts have also expressed reservations about the
Guideline ranges. For example, the Second Circuit, in United
States v. Dorvee, found that a 240-month sentence for
substantively
was
of child pornography
distribution
5
It was troubled that the Guidelines for
unreasonable."
trafficking offenses were not based on empirical data, but rather
on congressional directive. 6
There are courts and scholars who support the Guidelines."
For example, in testimony before the Sentencing Commission,
Ernie Allen, President of the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children, explained that, as with other illegal
contraband, child pornography needs to be stopped at the point of
production and at the point of distribution and possession.6 8 He
pointed out that the Supreme Court has found a causal link
between the demand for images and the possession and
distribution of the images.6 9 Some have discounted the oft-cited
Stabenow report as fundamentally flawed. 0 For example, one
district court judge noted Stabenow fails to identify the
characteristics of the "average offender" who charts at the
statutory maximum, but when one does so, it is a person that has
"more than 600 images of prepubescent child pornography
containing sadistic and masochistic images.""

6 United States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592, 606-07 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES
JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 (2010), available at http://www.usse.gov/
Research -and_Statistics/ResearchProjects/Surveys/20100608_JudgeSurvey.pdf).
65 616 F.3d 174, 176 (2d Cir. 2010).
* Id. at 184. It also found that the district court made procedural errors in
calculating the sentence. Id. at 181-82.
67 See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, No. 5:09CR534, 2010 WL 3219530, at *1
(N.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 2010), affd, 455 F. App'x 624 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d 844, 848-49 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (criticizing the
Stabenow report), affd, 669 F.3d 723 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Fiorella, 602
F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1074, 1076 (N.D. Iowa 2009), affd sub nom. United States v.
Shuler 598 F.3d 444 (8th Cir. 2010). See generally Exum, supra note 48.
6 See Ernie Allen, President & CEO, Nat'l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited
Children, Statement at the United States Sentencing Commission Regional Hearing
on the 25th Anniversary of the Passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Oct.
20, 2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative.andPublicAffairs/Public_
Hearings and_- Meetings/20091020-21/Allen-testimony.pdf.
69 Id. (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759-60, n.10 (1982); Osborne v.
Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1990)).
'o See, e.g., Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 852.
1 Id. (internal quotation marks ommitted).
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It is telling that the Commission itself has criticized the
direction Congress was taking.
With the Sentencing
Commission's call for public hearings on child pornography
sentences, even the Justice Department agreed that sentencing
enhancements based on the use of a computer and the number of
images involved in a crime need to be reassessed.7 2 In its 2012
report, the Commission recommended the guidelines be revised
to better measure culpability. For example, it agreed that the
number of images per se was an "outmoded measure[]" of an
offender's culpability;" instead, it suggested a new measure that
would focus on whether the offender engaged in online child
75
pornography communities.
Both sides make some sound arguments. There is validity to
critics' arguments that derivative harm is typically less severe
than direct harm.7 6 Yet they ignore that downstream users
inflict independent psychological and dignitary harm.77 They
may, in fact, be inflicting more harm than the producer of the
image. Take, for example, a recent case in which an elementary
school principal pled guilty to producing child pornography after
he was caught surreptitiously recording boys' genitals while they
were in the bathroom. 8 Here, the harm suffered by the victims
7' Letter from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Dir.,
Office of Policy and Legislation,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Chief Judge William K. Sessions III, U.S. Sentencing
Comm'n 6 (June 28, 2010), available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/files/annual_
letter_2010_final_062810.pdf.
We believe the Commission should complete its review of the sentencing
guidelines applicable to child exploitation crimes and prepare a report to
Congress that might include recommendations for reforming the current
child exploitation guidelines. The goal of any such reform would be to
update the guidelines to address changing technology and realities
surrounding these offenses, improve the consistency of sentences across
child exploitation crimes, and ensure that the sentences for certain child
exploitation offenses adequately reflect the seriousness of the crimes.
Id.
* 2012 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 320-25.
* Id. at 321.
* Id. at 312-14.
7 Some disagree with these arguments. See Hessick, supra note 48, at 866
(citing critics).
" See supra notes 179, 183.
78 Warren Richey, Child Pornography:FormerElementary-SchoolPrincipalGets
30 Years, CHRISTIAN SCl. MONITOR (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
Justice/2011/1122/Child-pornography-Former-elementary-school-prinicipal-gets-30years. The FBI also found 32,000 images and over 12,000 videos of child
pornography in his home, mostly obtained via the Internet. One might question
whether the display was the "lascivious exhibition of the genitals" as required to
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was the embarrassment and distress of knowing the images were
being circulated; they were not physically abused in the creation
of them. Thus, we cannot say that harm inflicted by downstream
users is less severe than harm inflicted by the producer of the
images; a more nuanced approach that focuses on case specifics
would be a better measure of harm.
The danger, however, of the intensity of the criticism of
current sentences is that it has caused some to dismiss the
premise that any harm has occurred. Many defendants claim
possession is a "victimless" crime," and while some lower courts
agree, more reasoned courts have soundly rejected the notion
that derivative use of child pornography is victimless.80 On the
other hand, mulish support of the current sentencing regime in
face of the mounting criticism of the Guidelines risks continued
judicial nullification and randomized sentences. While Congress
has sought to acknowledge the impact of technology on child
pornography offenses, it has done so only by expanding the range
of prohibited activities."' It would be wise for Congress to also
see technology as a limiting force in that the labels no longer
define distinct behaviors, and therefore, the differential
punishment scheme is increasingly devoid of rationale.
When we add to the sentencing controversy the new problem
of how technology has conflated the offenses, we are left with a
situation in dire need of reform. Essential to the solution is an
understanding of the technological changes to the manner in
which the child pornography crimes are being committed. The
next Part traces these changes.

qualify as child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2012), as it appears the boys were
merely urinating in the bathroom. See United States v. Johnson, 639 F.3d 433, 43940 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Kemmerling, 285 F.3d 644, 645-46 (8th Cir.
2002); United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986), affd sub nom.
United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1987).
7 See, e.g., United States v. D'Andrea, 473 F.3d 859, 865 (8th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Rogers, 423 F.3d 823, 828 (8th Cir. 2005); State v. Berger, 134 P.3d 378,
386 (Ariz. 2006).
so See, e.g., United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 259 (3d Cir. 2007) (criticizing
the district court's reasoning that a possession offense had no real victim); United
States v. Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d 844, 863-64 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (criticizing
courts that see possession as a victimless crime).
81 See 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2012).
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II. THE GROWTH OF TECHNOLOGY
As child pornography legislation developed over time, so did
computer technology. The late 1970s and early 1980s saw the
first spread of computers from isolated government and
industrial usage to everyday personal usage.82 Concomitantly,
connectivity between computers was evolving. In the 1970s,
computer engineers at research institutions throughout the
United States began to link their computers together using
telecommunications technology. The first networking card was
created in 1973, allowing data transfer between connected
computers.83 In time, the network, originally limited to academic
and military institutions, spread and became known as the
Internet.8 4
As computers were linked, file-sharing and online
discussions were becoming increasingly popular.
The first
Internet discussion system, "Usenet," was developed in 1979.5
Its main purpose was the exchange of text-based messages, but

82 See M. Scott Boone, The Past, Present, and Future of Computing and Its
Impact on DigitalRights Management, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 413, 416-18; see also
Rebecca Blain, Evolution of Technology: The History of Computers,
ARTICLESFACTORY, http://www.articlesfactory.com/articles/computers/the-evolutionof-technology-the-history-of-computers.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). The same
year, Microsoft released the MS-DOS operating system, which was easy to operate.
Id.
a Blain, supra note 82.
* Exhibits: Internet History 1970's, COMPUTER HISTORY MUSEUM,
http://www.computerhistory.org/internet history/internetLhistory_70s.html
(last
visited Mar. 2, 2014). The Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET)
was the world's first operational packet switching network and the core network of a
set that came to compose the global Internet. The network was funded by United
States Department of Defense for use by its projects at universities and research
laboratories. With packet switching, a data system could use one communications
link to communicate with more than one machine by collecting data into datagrams
and transmitting these as packets onto the attached network link, whenever the link
is not in use. Thus, not only could the link be shared, much as a single post box can
be used to post letters to different destinations, but each packet could be routed
independently of other packets. ARPANET-The First Internet, LIVING INTERNET,
http://www.1ivinginternet.com/ilii-arpanet.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
85 See generally John L. Sullivan III, Note, Federal Courts Act as a Toll Booth to
the Information Super Highway-Are Internet Restrictions Too High of a Price To
Pay?, 44 NEw ENG. L. REV. 935 (2010). Usenet was originally written by a computer
scientist at UNC to help communicate with Duke. COMPUTER HISTORY MUSEUM,
supra note 84.
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through attachments, it allowed users to encode files and
distribute them to participating subscribers of Usenet
newsgroups."
Between 1979 and the mid-1990s, file-sharing was done
through Usenet and bulletin board systems ("BBS"). 87
Thousands of BBSs sprang up, creating active virtual
communities. The "alt" hierarchy enabled the Usenet community
to exercise freedom of speech by allowing anyone to create a
group, such as alt.sex.88 Bulletin boards and Usenet eventually
became obsolete as the Internet grew in popularity. 9
In the 1990s, the tandem spread of applications like e-mail
and the World Wide Web and the development of fast networking
technologies like Ethernet90 saw computer networking become
commonplace. 9 ' The number of computers that are networked
has grown explosively, from one million in 199292 to over two
billion by 2012.93 A very large proportion of personal computers
regularly connect to the Internet to communicate and receive
information. "Wireless" networking, which uses mobile phone
networks, has meant that networking is becoming increasingly
pervasive.94
86 See Paul K. Ohm, Comment, On Regulating the Internet: Usenet, A Case
Study, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1941, 1945-49 (1999).
8
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FILE-SHARING PROGRAMS: PEER-TO-PEER
NETWORKS PROVIDE READY ACCESS TO CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 6 (2003), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03351.pdf.
" Brian
Reid,
Alt
Hierarchy
History,
LIVING
INTERNET,
http://www.livinginternet.com/h/uialt.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
89 See Sascha Segan, R.LP Usernet: 1980-2008, PCMAG (July 31, 2008),
www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2326849,00.asp.
90 John E. George & Paul F. Kolesar, 10-GigabitEthernet Development for LAN
Cabling Systems Well Underway, LIGHTWAVE (Dec. 1, 1999), http://www.light
waveonline.com/articles/print/volume-16/issue-13/special-report/10-gigabit-ethernetEthernet is
development-for-lan-cabling-systems-well-underway-53490282.html.
computer connectivity hardware that was developed by Xerox Parc, a research and
development company. Edward L. Rubin, Computer Languages as Networks and
Power Structures: Governing the Development of XML, 53 SMU L. REV. 1447, 1450
(2000).
91 Mark Ward, How the Web Went World Wide, BBC NEWS (Aug. 3, 2006,
2:26 PM), http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hiltech
nology/5242252.stm.
92 COMPUTER HISTORY MUSEUM, supra note 84.
" Internet Usage Statistics: The Internet Big Picture, INTERNET WORLD STATS,
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last updated Feb. 18, 2014).
9 See AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, MOBILE ACCESS 2010
2 (2010), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media/Files/Reports/2010/
PIPMobileAccess_2010.pdf.
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While file-sharing was initially done through Usenet and
Bulletin Boards, in 1999, Napster was released." Napster was a
centralized system that indexed and stored music files that
users of Napster made available on their computers for others to
download. 6 Files were transferred directly between users after
authorization by Napster.17 It became extremely popular, and in
2001, Napster was sued by several recording companies. Napster
lost in court against these companies and was eventually shut
down."
The next technological milestone was the development of
decentralized file-sharing systems.99 The decentralized systems
allow users to directly connect to each other's files, rather than
going through a central index site.' 0 In 2001, Kazaa was
released, with users mainly exchanging music files and other file
types, such as videos, applications, and documents, over the
Internet.' 0 Until its decline in 2004, Kazaa was the most
popular file-sharing program in the world. 10 2 As with Napster, it
faced, and lost, numerous copyright infringement suits, until it
declined in use and popularity. 10 3
' Spencer E. Ante et al., Inside Napster, BUSINESWEEK, Aug. 14, 2000, at 112,
114-15; M. Eric Johnson et al., The Evolution of the Peer-to-Peer File Sharing
Industry and the Security Risks for Users, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 41ST HAW. INT'L
CONFERENCE ON SYs. Scis. 2 (2008), available at http://www.computer.org/csdl/
proceedings/hicss/2008/3075/00/30750383.pdf.
" A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 905 (N.D. Cal.
2000), affd in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); see Karl Taro
Greenfeld, Meet the Napster, TIME (Oct. 2, 2000), http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,998068,00.html.
1 A & M Records, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 905.
98 Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and
the New Economics of DigitalTechnology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 287-89 (2002); A &
M Records, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 927.
* See Johnson et al., supra note 95, at 1-2.
o Napster's Sons: Singing a Different Tune?, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (Feb.
20, 2002), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2002-02-20/napsters-sons-singing-adifferent-tune.
"or See generally Richard Swope, Comment, Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and
Copyright Infringement: DangerAhead for Individuals SharingFiles on the Internet,
44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 861, 875-88 (2004).
10 Lance D. Clouse, Note, Virtual Border Customs: Prevention of International
Online Music Piracy Within the Ever-Evolving Technological Landscape, 38 VAL. U.
L. REV. 109, 122 n.63 (2003).
" See, e.g., Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 492-93, 515
(1st Cir. 2011); Eric Pfanner, Record and Movie Industries Reach a Settlement with
Kazaa, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/28/technology/
28kazaa.html? r=0.
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New iterations of file-sharing networks, such as Limewire
and BitTorrent, continue to allow no-cost, decentralized, peer-topeer file-sharing.10 4 Furthermore, file-sharing software evolved,
so that computer users no longer had to install and configure
sophisticated multiple file-sharing programs .1o5 Today, peer-topeer members need only download the compatible software from
the Internet to become part of the network and be able to
download digital files from other members of that network.1 06
They can also upload or post their files onto the network. 0
A crucial aspect of peer-to-peer file-sharing is that the
default setting for these networks is that downloaded files are
placed in the user's "shared" folder, which allows others in the
network to access the files. 08 A user must affirmatively change
his network setting to disable this sharing feature.'o
The
network is designed to encourage sharing by providing faster
downloading if the user allows sharing."o As the Internet has
grown, so too has online child pornography."' By 2005, child
pornography over the Internet was a 3 billion dollar-a-year
industry, consisting of over 4.2 million pornographic websites
and approximately 372 million pornographic pages."' The file10 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 91920 (2005). In 2010, the recording industry obtained a permanent injunction against
Limewire, shutting down its operation. See Arista Records LLC v. Lime Wire LLC,
No. 06 Civ. 05936 (KMW), 2010 WL 4256219 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010) (proposed
consent injunction). Shortly thereafter, unnamed developers released a new version
entitled "Limewire Pirate Edition." See Ethan Smith, LimeWire Disavows New
'Pirate Edition', WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000
1424052748704804504575606862080016220.html.
105Andrew Eichner, File Sharing: A Tool For Innovation, or a Criminal
Instrument?, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. (Sept. 2011), http://beiptf.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/09/AndrewEichnerNoteFileSharingElCedits-fmaledit.pdf.
'0
United States v. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 343, 352 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
107 Id.
108 See, e.g., United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 335 (4th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Carani, 492 F.3d 867, 875-76 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Griffin, 482
F.3d 1008, 1013 (8th Cir. 2007).
109 See Carani,492 F.3d at 869.
110 United States v. Geiner, 498 F.3d 1104, 1110-11 (10th Cir. 2007).
111 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 87, at 11, 13; see also U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CHILD EXPLOITATION PREVENTION
11 (2010), available at
AND INTERDICTION: A REPORT TO CONGRESS

http://wwwjustice.gov/pseddocs/natstrategyreport.pdf (listing internet distribution
channels).
112 Women's
Services & Resources, BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIV., Pornography,
https://wsr.byu.edu/pornographystats (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
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sharing network Gnutella has reported receiving 116,000
requests for child pornography in 2010."1 The ability to seek,
download, and share files has completely changed the landscape
for many industries, notably in the legitimate entertainment
world. It has had the same dramatic impact in the child
pornography arena.
The newest technology is cloud computing where files are
stored in a shared pool of computer resources on the Internet,
accessible from any computer." 4 Users do not download and
install applications on their own device or computer; all
processing and storage is maintained by the cloud server."' The
latest commercial uses promote file storage and access. For
example, a person may store files from his computer onto a cloud
service provider, such as Dropbox."6 The cloud system allows
him to access his files from any computer by logging onto his
cloud server."' A cloud user may permit shared access to his
Thus, similar to peer-to-peer
files by designating users."
networks, once a person allows access to his files, others may see
them at any time. Unlike peer-to-peer networks, private cloud
services require that a person designate who may have shared
access." 9
The cloud is just the latest battleground between law
The ability of child
enforcement and child pornographers.
pornographers to use cloud computing for their wares has
While some cloud providers are
already been recognized.
employing filtering techniques to suppress access to illegal

I" Exum, supra note 48, at 6; Pornography Industry Is Larger than the
Revenues of the Top Technology, CY TALK BLOG (Jan. 1, 2010), http://blog.cy
talk.com/2010/01/web-porn-revenue/.
' See PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NAT'L INST.OF STANDARDS & TECH.,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING 2 (2011),
available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf; see
also Cloud Computing: Clash of the Clouds, ECONOMIST (Oct. 15, 2009),
http://www.economist.com/node/14637206?story-id=14637206.
" See Cloud Computing: Clash of the Clouds, supra note 114.
116 Claire Cain Miller, Dropbox Bids To Find Entry in Businesses, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 28, 2011, at B10.
1
119

See MELL & GRANCE, supra note 114.

See id. at 3.
See id.
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images, there is a growing concern the cloud will provide deeper
cover for pornographers.1 2 0 At the same time, cloud technology is
beginning to raise possession and distribution questions. 2 '
III. THE LINES BLUR
As file-sharing networks have proliferated, participants in
the child pornography industry can no longer be defined by terms
suited for a bricks-and-mortar world rather than a virtual world.
We need to consider more fundamentally whether the problem is
not just the piecemeal growth of offenses and enhancements, but
whether the activities prohibited no longer have meaningful
distinctions in the Internet age.
In the late 1970s when investigative reporters first exposed
the child pornography market, it was clear who fell into the
categories of transporters, distributors, and receivers (possession
was not yet a crime).'2 2 For example, the defendant in New York
v. Ferberwas the owner of an adult bookstore and knowingly sold
films of underage boys masturbating.1 23 Once sold, those films
were distributed and were no longer available for Ferber to
resell. 2 4 In contrast, take the person today who uploads a child
pornography video to a peer-to-peer network and then leaves his
file open.
The video is never depleted; even if someone
downloads it, the original is still available for further downloads.
As the following discussion explores, the ramifications of this
new technology are causing a collapse of easily definable offenses
and a swell of fresh defense challenges.
A.

Receiving vs. Possessing
Let us compare the defendant in Osborne v. Ohio 2 5 to a
contemporary possessor.
Clyde Osborne was convicted of
violating an Ohio statute that barred the possession of child
pornography after police found four photographs of child
See Rob Gillen, Digital Forensicsand the Cloud, FEDScOOP (Jan. 17, 2011,
4:21 PM), httpJ/fedscoop.com/digital-forensics-and-the-cloud/; Martin Kaste, A Click
Away: Preventing Online Child Porn Viewing, NPR (Aug. 31, 2010, 4:12
PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=129526579 (discussing
filtering by internet service providers and search engines).
121 See infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
122 FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 603-04.
123 458 U.S. 747, 751-52 (1982).
120

124

See id.

125

495 U.S. 103 (1990).
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12 6
pornography in a desk drawer in the bedroom of his house.
The appellant testified a friend brought the pictures to his
It appears Osborne was charged only with the
home. 12 7
possession offense.12 8 Contrast Osborne with the defendant in

United States v. Davenport, in which government agents found

hundreds of images and videos of child pornography on the
defendant's computer.1 29 The defendant was indicted on one
count of receiving child pornography and on one count of
He pled guilty and was
possessing child pornography. 3 0
sentenced to seventy-eight months in prison for each count, to
run concurrently. 3 1
On appeal of the district court's denial of his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, the defendant argued the sentence on
both possession and receipt violated his Fifth Amendment double
jeopardy right because the two statutory provisions proscribe the
same conduct. 3 2 As the defendant claimed, "It is impossible to
'receive' something without, at least at the very instant of
'receipt,' also 'possessing' it." 133 The Ninth Circuit conducted a
Blockberger analysis'3 4 test and found that the receipt provision
did not require proof of any additional elements beyond those
required by the possession provision, and therefore, the

126Id.

at 139.

127

Id.

128

Id. at 106-07.
519 F.3d 940, 972 (9th Cir. 2008).

129

120 Id.

Id.
Id. at 942-43. The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause guarantees
that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
131
12

1"
124

Davenport, 519 F.3d at 943.

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). The Blockburger
Court stated that if "the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are
two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the
other does not." Id. In determining whether two statutory provisions are punishing
the same conduct, the courts first look to congressional intent. Absent clear intent to
punish the defendant under two provisions, it is presumed that the legislature does
not intend to impose two punishments for the same offense. See Rutledge v. United
States, 517 U.S. 292, 297 (1996). Nevertheless, the presumption against allowing
multiple punishments for the same crime may be overcome if there is a clear
indication of legislative intent to allow courts to impose them. See Missouri v.
Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344
(1981); United States v. Bobb, 577 F.3d 1366, 1371 (11th Cir. 2009).
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government could not charge defendant with both offenses.1 5
The court acknowledged that prior to 1998, when Congress
changed the requisite number of images for a possession charge
from three or more images to any number of images, prosecution
for violating both provisions was permissible because of the
variance in the number of images needed for prosecution of
receipt versus possession. 136 The court reasoned that the older
statutory language would allow for multiple convictions, but the
amended language made the possession crime fall in as a lesserincluded crime of the receipt of child pornography. 137
Other courts have agreed with Davenport's reasoning that
the prohibition against double jeopardy bars multiplicitous
charges of receipt and possession when a person downloads child
pornography from the Internet. 13 8 The remedy is to vacate the
lesser offense,1 39 which still highlights a difficulty with the
present statutory scheme-the receipt charge that remains has a
mandatory five-year minimum sentence. 140 Nevertheless, many
courts have distinguished the Davenport line of cases and have
"' Davenport, 519 F.3d at 947. The receipt statute requires that pornographic
material be "shipped or transported in ... interstate ... commerce by any means,
including by computer," while the possession law states the pornography need only
be "produced using materials that have been ... shipped or transported
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) (2012) with
§ 2252A(a)(5)(B). The Davenport court found that because possession's nexus
in . .. interstate . .. commerce."

requirement can be met in one of two ways and receipt's nexus requirement is one of
those two ways, possession is a lesser included offense of receipt. Davenport, 519
F.3d at 944-45.
136 Davenport, 519 F.3d at 946-47; see supra Part I.C. In a change that was
meant to demonstrate a "zero tolerance" policy toward child pornographers,
Congress amended the possession offense in 1998 to ban possession of even one
image, whereas previous legislation limited the offense to three or more images. See
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). Instead it gave defendants an affirmative defense if they
possessed fewer than three images. Id. § 2252A(d).
13' Davenport, 519 F.3d at 944-45. The court did recognize that an affirmative
defense was only applicable to the possession provision but stated affirmative
defenses are not considered elements of the crime for Blockburger purposes. Accord
United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 72 (3d Cir. 2008).
13 See, e.g., United States v. Brobst, 558 F.3d 982, 1000 (9th Cir. 2009); Bobb,
577 F.3d at 1374; Miller, 527 F.3d at 71; United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882,
891 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Schaff, 838 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1377 (S.D. Ga.
2011); United States v. Cunningham, No. 07-0298, 2010 WL 3809853, at *2 (W.D.
Pa. Sept. 22, 2010); United States v. Pomarico, No. 06 CR 113(RJD), 2010 WL
4608423, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2010); see also United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d
142, 154 (2d Cir. 2009) (dicta supporting Davenportreasoning).
139 See, e.g., Schaff, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 1380-81; Cunningham, 2010 WL
3809853, at *1; Pomarico,2010 WL 4608423, at *2.
1o See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1).
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upheld convictions for both receipt and possession when the
government asserts that its charges are different for image
downloads.
For example, in United States v. Bobb, the
defendant's convictions and sentences were based on activities
that occurred on two different dates.141 The evidence at trial
established the defendant received child pornography by
downloading files from a pornographic website, and on another
date, he possessed over 6,000 additional images. 142 Accordingly,
the Eleventh Circuit, while agreeing with the Davenport line of
reasoning, upheld the defendant's convictions, finding that the
government introduced evidence sufficient to convict him of

distinct offenses.14 3
With defendants using computers to obtain quantities of
images via the Internet, it appears quite easy for the government
to fashion a case in a manner to avoid double jeopardy violations
by basing the receipt count on different images than the
possession count.'" Yet, it is questionable whether such action is
appropriate when the statutes themselves no longer reflect clear
divisions of activity. It is outmoded to find, as some courts have,
that those who traffic in child pornography by receiving it "are
more directly tied to the market for such products" and the abuse
of children necessary for that market than are possessors. 14 5
When the person engages in one act 46 and thereby commits two
crimes, the stated rationale for highly divergent punishments is
dubious.

141

577 F.3d at 1369-70.

"' Id. at 1368-69.

us Id. at 1375. When multiple images are found, courts have held that these
images may not be the basis of multiple counts of the same offense. See, e.g.,
Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 155. But see United States v. Flyer, No. CR 05-1049 TUC-FRZ,
2006 WL 2590459, at *5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 7, 2006). Therefore, the 6,000 images
resulted in one count of possession. The number of images, however, is a sentencing
enhancement. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 147-48; United States v. Burgess, No.
1:09CR17, 2010 WL 2219335, at * 1 (W.D.N.C. May 28, 2010); cf United States. v.
Irving, 554 F.3d 64, 79 (2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting double jeopardy issue sua sponte).
'4
See United States v. Myers, 355 F.3d 1040, 1042-43 (7th Cir. 2004); accord
United States v. Davenport, 519 F.3d 940, 951 (9th Cir. 2008) (Graber, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tihe statutory provisions are directed toward different harms.");
United States v. Grosenheider, 200 F.3d 321, 332-33 (5th Cir. 2000).
146 It is, of course, possible to inadvertently receive child pornography and then
consciously choose to keep it. In that instance, the person would be guilty only of
possession. See United States v. Watzman, 486 F.3d 1004, 1009-10 (7th Cir. 2007).
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If we look at these cases in the context of the development of
the child pornography laws, we can see the genesis of the original
distinctions since possession was not initially covered and receipt
was initially thought of as part of the commercial trade; these
variables have disappeared. The Commission recognized this as
early as 1990 when it tried to join the receiving and possessing
offense Guidelines, a move roundly rejected by Congress.
Additionally, in its 1996 Report to Congress, the Commission
detailed that some courts were sentencing receipt cases as
possession cases because there was little difference in the
perceived seriousness of the offenses.4 8 The offense Guidelines
were eventually combined, but this created a new problemcertain enhancements previously limited to the trafficking
offenses now apply to simple possession cases.14 9
When a person can receive and possess images with a few
clicks of a mouse, the overlap in the offenses is obvious.o50 A
child is harmed because the image is circulated, but the offender
cannot be said to be more entrenched in the market by his receipt
than by his possession of the image.
B.

Distributingvs. Possessing

The conflation of offenses is further complicated because
distribution is both an offense and a sentencing enhancement to
receipt and possession charges.
1.

Distribution as an Offense
Peer-to-peer file-sharing, only popularized in the last few
years, has dramatically altered the collecting of child
pornography. It has also led to defendants being charged and
14
When possession was federally outlawed in 1991, Congress directed the
Commission to establish sentencing Guidelines for the new possession offense. 2009
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 19. Initially, the Commission amended the
Guidelines by moving the receipt offense to the new possession guideline because it
determined that "receipt is a logical predicate to possession." Id. It distinguished
possession and simple receipt from receipt with intent to traffic. Id. This change
lasted less than one month because of strong congressional objection to the reduced
penalty for receiving child pornography. Id. at 20-22. Thus, separate Guidelines
existed for trafficking offenses and possession offenses until 2004, when the
Commission consolidated them. Id. at 42.
148 2009 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 29-30.
1
Id. at 49; see supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
150 See 2012 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 326-27 (recommending that
the sentences for receipt and possession be aligned).
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convicted of both distributing and possessing child pornography.
For example, in United States v. Schaffer, a defendant
downloaded images and videos from a peer-to-peer network and
stored them in a shared folder on his computer, which was
accessible to others.1 51 Arguing that he merely left open his
shared file, the defendant sought to have his conviction for
distribution set aside.'5 2
The Tenth Circuit rejected his
contention, noting that he freely allowed access to his
computerized stash of images and videos, knowing that others
could download his stash. 15 3 The court made an analogy to a selfserve gas station reasoning that the gas station owner who
advertises his product need not actively pump gas to be in the
business of distributing it.'54 Similarly, it reasoned that the
knowing passive distribution of child pornography from a shared
network was sufficient to sustain the conviction.'5 5
Recently, some courts have recognized the overlap between
offenses caused by technology. The Third Circuit, in United
States v. Grober, affirmed a sentence that substantially deviated
from the Guidelines in a case where the defendant traded via the
Internet a number of images of child pornography.'5 6 Charged
with transporting, receiving, and possessing child pornography,
the defendant pled guilty.'"' The district court ruled this was a
"typical downloading" case, and sentenced him to sixty months
imprisonment-the mandatory minimum-rather than the
Rejecting the
Guideline amount of 235 to 293 months.'5 8
government's appeal of the sentence, the Third Circuit found that
the deviation was appropriate because it agreed that the case
"center [ed] on personal possession of illicit images obtained on

151
152

472 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1223.

153 Id.

"

Id. at 1223-24.

Id.; accord United States v. Collins, 642 F.3d 654, 656-57 (8th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 335 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Darway,
255 F. App'x 68, 70-72 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Geiner, 498 F.3d 1104,
1109-10 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Carani, 492 F.3d 867, 875-76 (7th Cir.
2007); United States v. Griffin, 482 F.3d 1008, 1011-12 (8th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Mathenia, 409 F.3d 1289, 1290 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Rogers,
666 F. Supp. 2d 148, 150-52 (D. Me. 2009); United States v. Abraham, No. CR NO.
05-344, 2006 WL 3052702, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2006).
156 See 624 F.3d 592, 595, 611 (3d Cir. 2010).
"6

15

Id.

'm

Id. at 596, 598-99.

at 595-96.
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line, and involving no production or distribution other than
noncommercial bartering," notwithstanding the defendant's
guilty plea on the transporting and receiving counts. 59
Distribution as Sentencing Factor
The category collapse among the child pornography offenses
is striking when we look at the courts' struggle with the meaning
of the enhancement variables, particularly when images are
distributed through file-sharing programs. From the outset, the
Guidelines included an increase to the base level applicable to
trafficking offenses if an image was distributed. 6 0 It later
distinguished between distributing in exchange for money or
other "things of value" and distributing without any gain.' 6 '
Courts have interpreted the phrase "thing of value" to mean
pornographic images a person actively trades over a peer-to-peer
network.16 2 Even if the person only downloads images, he can
meet the "thing of value" distribution enhancement if he knows
others have access to his images through the shared network.'
Merely getting faster download speeds, a crucial design function
of a peer-to-peer network, also constitutes a "thing of value.""
Thus, a number of courts held that using a peer-to-peer network
warrants a per se five-level distribution enhancement. 6 5 Other
courts apply only a lesser two-level enhancement when a
One court
defendant uses a peer-to-peer network.'66
2.

...Id. at 598 n.1.

See 2009 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 10.
See id. at 33-35 (internal quotation marks ommitted); see also U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(3) (2013). Distribution for pecuniary
gain and for "receipt, or expectation of receipt, of a thing of value, but not for
pecuniary gain" merits a five-level increase, and distribution for other reasons
merits a two-level increase. Id. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B). The Guidelines also called for a fivelevel increase if the distribution was to a minor and a seven-level increase if it was
to a minor with the intent to have the minor engage in prohibited sexual activity. Id.
§ 2G2.2(b)(3).
162 See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 482 F.3d 1008, 1013 (8th Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation marks ommitted); United States v. McVey, 476 F. Supp. 2d 560,
563 (E.D. Va. 2007).
" See United States v. Durham, 618 F.3d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 2010).
" See id.
160
161

165
166

See id.

See, e.g., United States v. Dodd, 598 F.3d 449, 451-52 (8th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Estey, 595 F.3d 836, 844 (8th Cir. 2010).
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acknowledged either enhancement could apply-a troubling
overlap because there appears to be no rhyme or reason to the
choice. 167
To rectify the problem, some courts have cut back on a per se
approach and have ruled the issue should be decided on a caseby-case basis.168 This solution has created its own issues because
courts have allowed the enhancement with little direct proof of
knowing distribution. Some courts have inferred knowledge
based on the level of sophistication of the computer user.'
Most troubling is judicial use of a "willful blindness"
standard to impose the distribution enhancement. For example,
in 2010, the Eighth Circuit upheld a finding that the defendant's
conduct warranted a distribution enhancement when he
downloaded images onto Limewire, a peer-to-peer program.170
The court rejected the defendant's contention that he did not
know his computer was equipped to distribute.1 7' It reasoned
that "the purpose of a file sharing program is to share, in other
words, to distribute. Absent concrete evidence of ignoranceevidence that is needed because ignorance is entirely
counterintuitive-a fact-finder may reasonably infer that the
defendant knowingly employed a file sharing program for its
intended purpose."172 The implications of this court's reasoning
cannot be understated. A willful blindness standard could
drastically increase a person's punishment and, in today's age,
may impact every user of a peer-to-peer program. Furthermore,
as new sharing platforms are created, more and more individuals
will be sharing information, whether they are aware or not.173
Criminality of such conduct must depend on more than a legal
tool such as willful blindness.

...See Estey, 595 F.3d at 843.
16 See id. at 843-44; Dodd, 598 F.3d at 451.
169 See, e.g., United States v. Bastian, 603 F.3d 460, 466 (8th Cir. 2010).
10 See Dodd, 598 F.3d at 451-52. As there was no evidence that defendant
received anything of value to warrant the five-level enhancement, the government
sought a two-level enhancement. Id. at 451.
171

See id. at 451-52.

Id. at 452; accord United States v. Durham, 618 F.3d 921, 932 (8th Cir. 2010)
(finding that defendant established actual ignorance); cf United States v. DuFran,
430 F. App'x 855, 857-58 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330,
335 (4th Cir. 2009).
" See infra notes 213-17 and accompanying text.
172
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Finally, courts are holding that defendants who use filesharing programs are ineligible for any decrease in the base level
offense originally passed by the Commission for simple receipt
For example, in 2011,
offenses with no proof of distribution.
the Seventh Circuit noted it would be frivolous for a defendant
who used a file-sharing program to argue for a two-level
decrease. 7' As the use of peer-to-peer networks continues to
grow, it will cause a de facto elimination of this decrease.
As courts increasingly differ on what actions qualify for
upward and downward sentence adjustments when a person uses
a peer-to-peer network to obtain child pornography, the courts'
actions are in danger of appearing arbitrary. For example, when
calculating the sentence for a person convicted of possession,
receipt, and distribution of child pornography via a peer-to-peer
network, the sentencing court would have to use different base
levels for each offense, and, in addition to other enhancement
calculations, decide the applicability of the distribution
sentencing factor, with the following possibilities: decrease by
two, increase by two, or increase by five. Such discretion is
arbitrary when it is not based on a reasoned calculation of the
harm a defendant has inflicted, but rather on outmoded
categories of offenses.
C.

Transportingvs. Possessing

Peer-to-peer file-sharing has also resulted in defendants
being charged with transporting child pornography when they
leave their network open. In a case virtually indistinguishable
from Shaffer," prosecutors chose to charge a defendant with
transporting child pornography rather than distributing it. 77
The same use of a peer-to-peer network now exposes a defendant
to charges of transporting, distributing, receiving, and possessing
child pornography.
As technology evolves, so too should the law. We should not
have de facto and unintentional changes in offenses and
sentences. For example, when the Commission combined the
trafficking and possessing Guidelines, it exposed possessors to
distribution enhancements because of sharing networks. In
See 2009 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 48.
United States v. Armes, 415 F. App'x 729, 730 (7th Cir. 2011).
472 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2007).
"7 United States v. Schade, 318 F. App'x 91, 93 (3d Cir. 2009).
174
175
1o

1042

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:1013

addition, the same network use has essentially eliminated the
two-level receiving decrease. As the Commission moves forward
with its review, it must assess whether these changes were
intentional and whether they result in appropriate sentences.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

Political implications for members of Congress should they
appear to be soft on child pornographers means statutory
changes may be difficult to enact; nevertheless, these
recommendations are made with a view of at least helping to
shape a discussion of these issues. Employing a harm principle
gives a starting point for addressing current offenses and
sentencing controversies. As the landmark child pornography
cases have stated repeatedly, users of child pornography cause
the depicted child to be shamed and humiliated by the knowledge
people are looking at the images of the child being abused."'
This humiliation is exacerbated by the Internet. As one
court described, "[T]he child victims suffer not only from the
initial physical sexual abuse of their tormentors, but also from
the knowledge that their degradation will be repeatedly viewed
electronically into near perpetuity by a large audience.""7
When adult abuse survivors become aware that the images
of them as children are circulating on the Internet, they become
even more mistrustful of people and have more of a sense of
helplessness and hopelessness. 8 0 As one psychologist explained,
"In childhood, they knew that they were physically invaded and
they couldn't stop it. As adults, they know they're visually
invaded and they can't stop it.... So, knowing that [the images
are] out there just deepens the pathology that they're already
suffering from."'8
Beyond psychological injury, a more fundamental harm is
suffered. Even if the child was unaware the image was
circulated, those who trade in and view child pornography harm
See supra notes 16-19, 29 and accompanying text. Other harms are that
users contribute to the market for child pornography that could lead to abuse of
additional children, and that children can be "groomed" into permitting acts of abuse
against them if they see images and perceive that the behavior is acceptable. See
generally Rogers, supra note 13.
179 United States v. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 343, 357 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); see also New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-60 (1982).
171

181s
C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d at 382.
181 Id.

2013]

TECHNOLOGYAND CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAWS

1043

the child's inherent right not to be viewed in this fashion. There
is harm each and every time an image is circulated. From where
does this human dignity right derive? This right goes beyond
tort theories on invasion of privacy.'82 We can look to more
analogous situations for answers.
A.

The FundamentalHarm in Images

Images are so powerful that, in diverse settings, special rules
apply to them. For example, the Geneva Convention requires
that prisoners of war ("POWs") be treated humanely, and this
includes banning photographs of them that subject them to
humiliation or public curiosity. 8 3 Some courts have construed
the term "public curiosity" to ban photographs that are released
for the purpose of humiliating those depicted.'8 4 Under Articles
13 and 14 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions III Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, POWs are also "entitled in all
circumstances to respect for their persons and their honour." 8 5
Even non-POWs, or so-called enemy combatants, are entitled to
protection against "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular

The issue of restitution to victims from pornographers under
18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (2012), the mandatory restitution statute, has been the
subject of recent court decisions and has split circuit courts. Some circuit courts have
held that possessors are too remote to be the proximate cause of a victim's injury and
therefore no damages are recoverable. See, e.g., United States v. Aumais, 656 F.3d
147, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2011). Others have held that the restitution statute has only a
limited proximity requirement. See, e.g., In re Amy Unknown, 636 F.3d 190, 198 (5th
Cir. 2011), affd in part and vacated in part, 701 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2012). The
impact of these cases on the current issue is doubtful as they deal with
remuneration; criminal culpability dependent on outmoded statutory classifications
raises wholly separate issues. While on the surface one might argue that if a
possessor is not liable for damages, then he should not be criminally liable, the
Supreme Court has long laid to rest the constitutionality of punishing possessors.
See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111-14 (1990). In fact, even in Aumais, the court
upheld the possessor's sentence of 121 months. Aumais, 656 F.3d at 156-57.
13 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War art. 13,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 27, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
75 U.N.T.S. 287. See generally Robert Cryer, The Fine Art of Friendship:Jus In Bello
in Afghanistan, 7 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 37, 73-76 (2002); Noel Whitty, Soldier
Photography of Detainee Abuse in Iraq: Digital Technology, Human Rights and the
Death of Baha Mousa, 10 HuM. RTs. L. REV. 689, 691 (2010).
184 ACLU v. Dep't of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 90 (2d Cir. 2008), vacated on other
grounds, 130 S. Ct. 777 (2009).
185 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra
note 183, art. 14.
182
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humiliating and degrading treatment."'* One need only think of
the disgrace over the Abu Ghraib incident to see the impact of
photographs. It was not just the humiliating treatment itself; it
was the taking and dissemination of photographs of the
humiliation that was contemptible."' The same criticism was
made following the release of photographs of Saddam Hussein
after his capture.' 8
Death scene and autopsy photographs are also subject to
dissemination restrictions. In National Archives and Records
Administration v. Favish,8 9 the Supreme Court ruled that
families are entitled to limit disclosure of death-scene images of
their loved ones.190 The case involved death-scene photographs of
Vincent Foster, Jr., deputy counsel to President Clinton, and the
respondent's Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request for the
photos. In denying the FOIA request, the Court noted FOIA
Exemption 7(C) excuses from disclosure information compiled by
law enforcement if its production "could reasonably be expected
to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."'
Foster's sister explained her opposition to the release of the
photos: "[I] was horrified and devastated by [a] photograph
[already] leaked to the press.

[Elvery time I see it,

. .

. I have

nightmares and heart-pounding insomnia as I visualize how he
must have spent his last few minutes and seconds of his life."192
She opposed the disclosure of the disputed pictures because

186 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)
art. 75(2)(b), June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1423. See generally Cryer, supra note 183.
187 See Cryer, supra note 183, at 74 n.200 ("[T]he reference is, strictly speaking
to the customary concomitant of art. 75, as the US is not bound by the Protocol,
having signed, but not ratified it."); Pamela Hess, Geneva Convention Prohibits
Filming POWs, UNITED PRESS INT'L (Mar. 23, 2003), http://www.upi.com/BusinessNews/Security-Industry/2003/03/23/Geneva-Convention-prohibits-filming-POWs/
UPI-80261048460384/.
18 Josh White & Ellen Knickmeyer, U.S. Officials Condemn Hussein Photos;
Investigation Begun After British Tabloid Publishes Pictures of Iraqi in Custody,
WASH. POST, May 21, 2005, at A13.
189 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
190 Clay Calvert, Salvaging Privacy & Tranquility from the Wreckage: Images of
Death, Emotions of Distress & Remedies of Tort in the Age of the Internet, 2010
MICH. ST. L. REV. 311, 312; see also Favish, 541 U.S. at 170.
191 Favish, 541 U.S. at 160 (internal quotation marks omitted).
192 Id. at 167 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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"[u]ndoubtedly, the photographs would be placed on the Internet
for world consumption" and would renew media interest in her
brother's death.'
The Court agreed that FOIA exemption 7(C) extended
beyond the person depicted to his family members and banned
release of the images, unless the person requesting the
information establishes a significant public interest in the
information sufficient to override the family's privacy interest in
the images.19 4 It found that the respondent failed to meet this
burden."' Tort law also limits dissemination of non-newsworthy
death and autopsy images.

They are deemed to be inherently

humiliating and distressful for the family and can subject the
releasers to damages.'9
Other courts ban the release of private information even if
identities are protected.

In Northwestern Memorial Hospital v.

Ashcroft, the government sought medical records of patients who
received late-term abortions to aid the government's
constitutional challenge to the Partial-Birth Abortion Act of
2003.198 In rejecting the government's demand, the Seventh
Circuit ruled it would be an invasion of the privacy rights of
anonymous patients.199 The court's reasoning is particularly
relevant to the victims of child pornography:
Imagine if nude pictures of a woman, uploaded to the Internet
without her consent though without identifying her by name,
were downloaded in a foreign country by people who will never
meet her. She would still feel that her privacy had been
invaded. The revelation of the intimate details contained in the
record of a late-term abortion may inflict a similar wound.200
Dissemination of images for no worthy purpose inflicts harm
on the depicted person. The absolute lack of any worthy reason
to trade in child pornography establishes the inherent harm to
the dignity of the child depicted. The person inflicting the abuse
captured in a pornographic image is obviously deserving of
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 172.
195 Id. at 175. See generally Calvert,supra note 190.
196 Calvert, supra note 190, at 313.
197 See, e.g., Catsouras v. Dep't of Cal. Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352,
357 (Ct. App. 2010), modified, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 253 (Ct. App. 2010).
19s 362 F.3d 923, 924 (7th Cir. 2004); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012).
'93

194

" Nw. Mem'l Hosp., 362 F.3d at 929.
200

Id.
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substantial punishment as a child molester. The producer of the
image is guilty of documenting the infliction of sexual abuse. The
harm that others further down the chain inflict lacks physicality,
but they too inflict distinct, actual harm on the child whose
image is disseminated and collected.
B.

Statutory and Guideline Changes

Under current federal law, producers are punished
separately and most severely.20 1 Others in the pornography
network are differentiated by activity,202 and the law treats
attempts to commit prohibited offenses equally to the completed
offenses.20 3 As explained in Part III, however, when a person
uses file-sharing technology, the categories of prohibited
activities involving child pornography no longer reflect crisply
defined actions. Thus, transporters, distributors, and possessors
often are one and the same, engaging in identical activity. We
can define them as "traders."
In place of the current statutory scheme, a more valid
delineation would be among producers, traders, and seekers of
child pornography. Since it is the producer who usually inflicts
the most harm, he should have the most severe sentence; traders
also harm the child, but typically to a lesser degree because they
are not involved in any direct sexual abuse of a child. One
possibility is that all activities involving the trading of child
pornography have the same statutory base sentence. This is in
keeping with fundamental harm theory because the depicted
children are damaged by any and all proliferation of their
images. Starting at the same base level, the Commission could
then establish enhancements or departures to distinguish among
the traders and their individual culpability. For example, one
suggestion is that the first person to upload images be punished
more severely than later downloaders. 20 4 Similarly, one who runs
a chat room or bulletin board is more culpable than those who
visit those sites.

18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2012) (minimum fifteen year, maximum thirty year
sentence).
20 Id. § 2252A.
204 Id.
2251(e),
u
2252A(b)(1), 2252A(b)(2).
21 Exum, supra note 48, at 39.
201

2013]

TECHNOLOGYAND

CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAWS

1047

A caveat to placing all traders in the same base category is
that it should not automatically increase sentences for
possessors-which would occur if the current divisions between
distributors, receivers, and possessors are made into one.
Instead, Congress needs to reexamine the current mandatory
sentence structure against the backdrop of the blurring of
offenses that exists with current technology.2 05
Those who have not yet obtained images should be punished
lesser still since they have not yet inflicted harm. 206 This
suggestion is in keeping with the basic tenet of attempt laws that
do not punish attempts as severely as completed crimes.2 07 Thus,
the statutes which now contain the same punishment for those
attempting to commit child pornography could be parsed so the
attempt is punished at a lower level. The attempts are more
comparable to the child pornography crimes of pandering and
belong more appropriately grouped together.2 08
As previously discussed in Part III, many scholars and
judges have criticized the Guideline enhancement for number of
images possessed. 20 9 Troy Stabenow has argued that punishing a
defendant based on the number of images he or she has
accumulated is akin to punishing a habitual marijuana smoker
for every marijuana cigarette he or she has smoked over the past
several years. 2 10 This analogy is wrong in that it does not
acknowledge the offender has violated each child's right not to be
viewed in a pornographic image. The collection continues to
exist, unlike the dissipated marijuana, and the defendant who
knowingly accesses large amounts of child pornography is
harming large numbers of children. A better approach suggested
by the Sentencing Commission would focus on the extent to
which an offender is involved in online child pornography
Even the Justice Department agrees. See Wroblewski, supra note 72, at 3-6.
See generally Audrey Rogers, New Technology, Old Defenses: Internet Sting
Operations and Attempt Liability, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 477, 479-83 (2004).
207 See generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL
LAW 473-74
(2000); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 646-47 (5th ed. 2010).
208 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B). In keeping with the thesis of
this Article, since
the pandering offense is an inchoate crime, Congress should re-examine its sentence,
which is currently a mandatory five-year minimum. Id. § 2252A(b)(1).
209 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying
text.
210 Jesse P. Basbaum, Note, Inequitable Sentencing for Possession
of Child
Pornography:A Failure To Distinguish Voyeurs from Pederasts, 61 HASTINGS L.J.
1281, 1301 n.163 (2010) (describing a telephone Interview with Troy Stabenow,
Assistant Federal Public Defender on January 13, 2010).
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communities.2 1 ' In addition, the use-of-computer enhancement
does not adequately relate to the harm suffered by the child
depicted and should be eliminated.2 12
The need to reform the laws becomes more urgent as
technology continues its unabated growth. For example, cloud
computing is becoming more and more popular.2 13 Shared file
functions that are available may make cloud computing
analogous to peer-to-peer networking, but on a much larger
platform. Given this technology, a person who collects child
pornography by storing it on a cloud server may also be a
distributer of the image by virtue of the sharing function of his
cloud files.2 14 Yet, since the images are stored on a remote server,
some have questioned whether and who possesses them.216
Similarly, as wireless routers are now increasingly used to
access the Internet, a person who fails to lock his router with a
password could potentially be charged if his router is used by
someone to transmit child pornography. 216 The analogy would be
to peer-to-peer file sharers who fail to opt out of the sharing
function. Taken to its logical extreme, the same willful blindness
standard the courts have used in the file-sharing cases could
apply to owners of unprotected routers.2 17 Of course, there is a
difference in that a third person is hacking into an unprotected
wireless network, as opposed to being part of a file-sharing
network, but one who knows and fails to protect his router from
unauthorized access is leaving himself open to charges.

supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
See supra text accompanying note 77; supra note 178.
21 See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
211 See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Stanley in Cyberspace: Why the Privacy Protection
of the FirstAmendment Should Be More Like That of the Fourth, 62 HASTINGS L.J.
357, 364 (2010).
215 Id.
216 See Jean-Loup Richet, FBI Child Porn Raid a Strong Argument for Locking
Down WiFi Networks, INFO. SYSTEMS
RES. BLOG (June 2, 2011),
http://www.information-systems-research.com/blog/201106/02/fbi-child-porn-raid-astrong-argument-for-locking-down-wifi-networks. No charges were brought against
the unwitting host. Id.
217 Cf Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S.Ct. 2060, 2068-69 (2011)
(discussing willful blindness standard applied in patent infringement case). There is
a difference in that a person is hacking into an unprotected wireless network, as
opposed to being part of a file-sharing network, but whether this is legally
significant is untested as yet.
211 See
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CONCLUSION

Fears that the Internet would be a boon to child
pornographers have been realized as the number of images
permanently circulating in cyberspace has ballooned into the
millions. Yet, to be effective in punishing this flood, the law must
accurately delineate the culpable conduct. The divisions among
traders of child pornography are no longer accurate; and,
therefore, the differentials in punishment have lost their
underpinnings. The current sentencing controversy surrounding
child pornographers is merely the tip of the iceberg of the larger
need to revamp the offenses themselves.
Optimally, Congress should revise the child pornography
statutes to reflect technology; however, most likely this is
politically unfeasible. Nevertheless, failure to act will allow the
current debate to harden positions with negative consequences.
Harsh sentences, such as life imprisonment for possession of
child pornography, as one court imposed recently, are
counterproductive to the ostensible rationale for punishment.18
Rather than deterring the prohibited activity, it causes some to
question the validity of the offense itself or minimize its gravity.
At the other extreme, to equate the harm inflicted by sexual
predators in producing pornographic images of children, with
that of downstream traders, is equally ineffective. The proposed
framework, at the very least, may allow judges to properly tailor
punishments and give the Commission guidance in revamping its
Guidelines.

218 Erica Goode, Life Sentence for Possession of Child PornographySpurs Debate
over Severity, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2011, at A9.
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